

APPENDIX No. 5

This appendix consists of comparisons of the Records of the Roberts Commission and the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to any conflicts between the two Records.

Witness	Statements RC	Statements APHB	Conflicts and discrepancies
Major General Walter Campbell Short. (Vols. 2 and 14, RC—, Vols. 4 and 5, APHB)	<p>In response to question "The only thing that the Joint Agreement between you seems to cover is distant reconnaissance?" General Short responded, "Yes. That was very definitely placed upon the Army even to the point of controlling the planes, which is the only logical way because otherwise if two people are made responsible they may be making reconnaissance in the same sector and another sector may be forgotten." (Vol. 2; 56.)</p> <p>"Up to time of attack, small amount of this wire (for fencing air fields against sabotage or uprisings) * * * had been received * * *". (Vol. 2; 45.)</p> <p>"The first of the three inch guns to fire down there was at 8:30, and all of the three inch guns were in action by 10:00 o'clock". (Vol. 2; 81)</p> <p>"* * * by 8:50 all of the pursuit that was serviceable were in the air. * * * By 11:40 all the bombers that were still serviceable were in the air—and sent out on distance reconnaissance." (Vol. 2; 85).</p> <p>"They made a search * * * starting * * * at 11:27 they sent—first at 11:40, at 1300, and 1350, and then the first search they made under Navy control was at 1520 * * *". (Vol. 14; 1635).</p> <p>"* * * the 24th Division * * * were out firing on enemy planes as early as 8:11. They moved to battle positions about 8:30, and at 5 o'clock in the afternoon all troops in this group were in battle positions and had one day firing. * * * the 25th Division also started moving into its battle position at 8:30 and by 4 in the afternoon was in its battle position with one day of firing." (Vol. 2; 88).</p> <p>"My reconnaissance under the plan with the Navy is limited to just the immediate offshore of the island, ordinarily limited to 15 miles. The Navy had assumed full responsibility for the distant reconnaissance". (Vol. 2; 107)</p>	<p>"* * * long-distance reconnaissance was definitely a function of the Navy * * *". (Vol. 4; 281)</p> <p>"* * * wherein all the long range reconnaissance of both the Army and Navy functioned under one plan so that there would not be any duplication of reconnaissance and there would be an undivided responsibility. So that the Navy definitely had the responsibility." (Vol. 4; 282.)</p> <p>No fencing received by 7 Dec. (Vol. 4; 290.) "We had not gotten the material at the time of the attack (for the fence)". (Vol. 5; 477.)</p> <p>"The first three inch guns to get into action at 8:15, and between 8:15 and 10:00 they were all put in readiness". (Vol. 4; 314)</p> <p>"* * * by 7:50 all the pursuit that was in condition to get into the air was put into the air." (Vol. 4; 317).</p> <p>"The pursuit planes were actually in the air by 8:50 * * * taking a little longer for the bombers * * * they were actually in the by 11:27". (Vol. 5; 459).</p> <p>"* * * Gen. Martin * * * at 11:27 sent planes out on his own mission * * *". (Vol. 4; 373).</p> <p>"The 24th Division turned out at 8:10 and returned the fire of the enemy planes and at 8:30 they were moving out to their battle positions. The 25th Division was also moving out to their battle positions by 8:30. By 4 o'clock the 24th Division were all in battle positions and the 25th by 5 o'clock." (Vol. 4; 316).</p> <p>Distant reconnaissance meant "anything beyond the 20 mile zone". (Vol. 4; 373)</p> <p>"The close-in reconnaissance going out 20 miles". (Vol. 5; 473).</p>	<p>Conflict in responsibility for reconnaissance.</p> <p>Slight discrepancy in whether fencing received.</p> <p>Slight discrepancy in time.</p> <p>Some slight confusion on questions of time.</p> <p>Some slight discrepancy in question of time.</p> <p>Discrepancy in extent of inshore patrol.</p>

Witness	Statements RC	Statements APHB	Conflicts and discrepancies
Major General Walter Campbell Short—Continued	<p>“So we made a comprehensive study and had asked to have probably 184 B-17s so that we could make a 360-degree patrol for a thousand miles.” (Vol. 2; 147.)</p> <p>Didn't see Navy message of 27 Nov. “this is a war warning”. (Vol. 2; 143.)</p> <p>No Naval Officers at AWS at the interceptor command station on morning of 7 Dec 1941. “There had been on previous days, and as a matter of fact the Navy had felt that it would be a good idea to have a little more of that * * * Total of 30 officers at interceptor command station including the normal quota of three Naval Officers. (Vol. 2; 69-70)</p> <p>Did not know the Naval Officer concerned with cooperating in a technical sense. “It might have been Capt. DeLany but I think it was more likely the officer doing corresponding work under Adm. Bloch, but, I do not know”. (Vol. 14; 1628)</p>	<p>“We had asked * * * we made a study and showed them it was necessary to have 187 B-17s for a proper reconnaissance in case the Navy was ever pulled out * * *”. (Vol. 4; 324.)</p> <p>“If feel sure that I have seen that message, although we couldn't find a copy of it in our headquarters, when we looked for it, for the Roberts Commission Report. That was during the period when I was down there at Kimmel's headquarters every day for three or four days and in all probability he either read it to me, or I read it right there, because it is familiar to me, but we couldn't find a copy”. (Vol. 4; 415-416.)</p> <p>Whether a Naval man was actually detailed as part of the Information Center witness could not say definitely. “I know the request had been made, that it was contemplated, and I thought it had been carried out.” (Vol. 5; 493)</p>	<p>Slight discrepancy in number of B-17s requested.</p> <p>Confusion as to whether had or had not seen Navy message of 27 Nov.</p> <p>Confusion as to whether or not Navy man detailed to interceptor command post by Navy.</p>
Major George S. Welch (Then Lt.) (Vol. 4 RC. Vol. 18 APHB).	<p>In testifying as to the enemy planes brought down witness declared “I was given credit for 5, but I did not see the other one.” (Vol. 4; 426).</p> <p>In response to the question whether there were any machine guns, witness responded “No, sir.” and later in response to the question “Was there any installation of antiaircraft guns ready for action then?” witness responded “No, Sir, there were none ready. There were pits dug, but no guns in them.” (Vol. 4; 427).</p>	<p>In speaking of the number of Jap planes shot down witness declared “I claimed 4 definitely.” (Vol. 18; 2012).</p> <p>“* * * the men had machine guns out, 30 caliber ground guns and they shot back at this man, this Jap.” (Vol. 18; 2011).</p>	<p>Some confusion in testimony concerning the number of planes brought down by witness.</p> <p>The question as to whether there were or were not machine guns.</p>
1st Sgt Lowell V. Klatt (Vol. 4, RC —, Vol. 13, APHB)	<p>“* * * we would see them cut loose with their machine guns, and numerous places there was splinters flying and things like that. And at that, why, I figured it was something important, so I told my detail to get their packs, get the trucks down, and be ready to take off. And while I was doing that Lt. Saltzman gave the word that we were on the alert, to go to our battalion command post and set up communications.” (Vol. 4; 465)</p>	<p>Witness testified that Lt. Saltzman notified witness before the bombing to “get my stuff and hit the field.” (Vol. 13; 1460)</p>	<p>Slight discrepancy as to time witness received order.</p>

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1st. Sgt. Lowell V. Klatt—Continued	In response to question, did both planes crash or just one, witness replied "No, Sir; only the second one, the one that swung to the left. We didn't get a chance to fire at the first one to amount to anything because he pulled away from us pretty fast, but the other one pulled—swung right around broadside to us." (Vol. 4; 467)	"The communications officer, Lt. Saltzman, and I were fortunate enough to knock both of the down with BAR fire." (Vol. 13; 1461)	Slight discrepancy in number of planes brought down by witness.
Colonel Walter C. Phillips. (Vol. 3 RC. Vol. 10 APHB)	Witness states he did not believe the Navy furnished him a copy of telegram sent by Navy operations on 27 Nov. (Vol. 3; 212) " * * * hostilities or attack from without, any such thing wasn't visualized by us at that time * * * we didn't visualize anything from without at that time, Sir". (Vol. 3; 215; cf. 236) Witness stated that Alert No. 1 was sufficient to carry out the directive of 27 Nov. (Vol. 3; 221)	"That message was received by the General, and I believe it was read to us all. I am not positive about that though". (Vol. 10; 1115) Witness stated that all higher commanders and staff were "all thoroughly alert and fully conscious of the possibility" or imminence of war, "the Navy as well as the Army". (Vol. 10; 1116) "I was fully aware of the possibility of such a thing. (Vol. 10; 1117; see also 1128) Witness admits that under Alert No. 3, fighters could have gotten into the air in from 5 to 7 minutes meeting the attack and rendering it less devastating. Witness admits he failed to recommend the most effective steps to meet the worst attack the enemy could bring against him. In mitigation, witness stated that subsequent message from WD, G-2 directed to anti-sabotage measures con fired action taken. (Vol. 10; 1125-1128) Witness admitted not following Leavenworth teaching. (Vol. 10; 1128)	Witness evasive. C of S normally gets communications before CG. Did he know contents or not? Flat contradiction. Did he expect attack or not? Conflict as to witness' belief in sufficiency of Alert No. 1.
Major General Howard C. Davidson, commanding Tenth Air Force. (Vols. 2 and 14, RC—, Vol. 36 APHB)	Witness testified that dispersal of airplanes adds to the risk of sabotage. (Vol. 2; 196)	Witness testified in the event of sabotage or attack the question of fire is a greater hazard, consequently, the more dispersed the planes are the less chance there is of fire spreading.	Direct conflict on advisability of "bunching" airplanes.